Boardroom Tool
The Board’s Role in Ransomware Preparedness and Response
Structure oversight of ransomware preparedness and response, by focusing on risk governance, scenario planning, and decision-making under pressure.
Boardroom Tool
Board Discussion Guide on Quantum Computing
This tool, featured in the fifth edition of the NACD-ISA Director's Handbook on Cyber-Risk Oversight, presents an overview of anticipated impacts and applications of quantum technologies, and provides suggested cybersecurity-related questions for board members to discuss with management as the technology matures and transitions into the marketplace.
Quantum computing presents both opportunity and existential risk. While its commercial applications remain nascent, its potential to break widely used cryptographic systems—including RSA and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC)—makes it one of the most significant emerging risks in cybersecurity governance. Quantum threats are not hypothetical; adversaries may already be “harvesting now, decrypting later," collecting encrypted data with the expectation of unlocking it once quantum capability matures.
Quantum computing research is advancing quickly; with many experts forecasting “Q-Day,” that will likely arrive before the end of this decade. Q-Day refers to the day when quantum computers will be able to use multistate quantum bits or “qubits” to break the encryption algorithms at the heart of digital security technologies currently used to secure the internet and digital devices.
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Post-Quantum Encryption (PQE) are closely related, often overlapping terms in the context of securing data against future quantum computer attacks. PQC refers to the creation of the mathematical algorithms, methods, and cryptographic techniques themselves (e.g. lattice-based or code-based algorithmic structures). PQE is a broader term that specifically emphasizes the application of these new quantum-resistant algorithms to encrypt data (i.e. the post-quantum resistant solution or technology.)
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has published approved PQC standards and selected algorithms. Boards should be aware that with these select algorithms have been “proofed” to be post-quantum resilient, eliminating the need for most organizations to launch their own PQC creation programs. Organizations should move quickly to update the encryption of their data using PQE.
The pertinent question for board members is not when will quantum computing arrive; it is rather will your organization be ready?
When Q-Day arrives, critical data—including intellectual property, banking information, personally identifiable information, personal health information, and other “secrets”, will be susceptible to decryption by quantum computers, making all current information vulnerable to exposure. The degree of quantum readiness will also likely become an audit/compliance issue.
Many experts are advising that boards should be planning for the coming quantum transition now. However, current research suggests that is not generally the case. A 2026 Bain & Company analysis found that 90 percent of companies are unprepared for quantum security threats, even though many executives expect such threats to materialize within the next five years. A 2025 Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) study found that only 4 percent of organizations have a defined quantum strategy despite growing concern about the durability of existing encryption. Similarly, a survey conducted by the Trusted Computing Group found that 91 percent of businesses lack a road map to protect against quantum threats.
Boards cannot afford to ignore quantum risk until the technology is fully realized. Transitioning a reasonably sophisticated IT system to accommodate quantum impacts could take years and substantial expense. It may cost several million dollars just to do the review and discovery of needed alterations and twice that much for planning and testing. Doing this transition retrospectively may cost many times these amounts.
Delayed preparation for Q-Day substantially increase costs, but could also make adequate and timely transition impractical due to the lack of qualified technical staff. Multiple studies indicate that quantum risk is widely recognized, yet workforce planning for post-quantum transition has barely begun. In practice, post-quantum cryptography has moved beyond a research challenge to an execution challenge—and execution depends on people.
Should a cryptographically relevant quantum computer arrive within the next few years, most organizations (including critical infrastructure providers), would be unable to transition in time—not for lack of awareness, but because the workforce needed to do so does not yet exist at scale.
There are several major points of consensus regarding the advent of quantum computing:
High-performing boards will prioritize preparing their organization to migrate to post-quantum cryptography at the top of their agendas to ensure their organizations will be ready to thrive in a post-quantum marketplace.
The following provides practical guidance for directors to operationalize the handbook principles in addressing quantum risk.
National Security Agency (NSA) Post-Quantum Cybersecurity Resources
Resources include post-quantum cryptography algorithms, quantum key distribution, and quantum key cryptography
Toolkit For Action
Fifteen specialized tools with best practices that enable boards to address common, board-level cyber-risk oversight issues.
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