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After Enron: A Survey for Corporate Directors
| Percent |
| 1. Very closely | 51 |
| 2. Somewhat closely | 47 |
| 3. Did not follow the story closely | 2 |
1 - How closely have you followed the Enron situation? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Very closely 91 51.1% 2. Somewhat closely 84 47.2% 3. Did not follow the story closely 3 1.7%
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 55 |
| 2. No | 45 |
2 - Have you asked your internal and/or external auditors about risks similar to those discovered at Enron or asked for additional assurances about your organization because of the Enron situation? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 97 54.8% 2. No 80 45.2%
| Percent |
| Disclosures | 63 |
| Off-balance sheet transactions, relat... | 65 |
| Derivatives or other complex financia... | 34 |
| Risk management | 41 |
| Independence of the external auditor | 58 |
| Adequacy of external auditing | 50 |
| Adequacy of internal auditing | 47 |
| Ethics policies or practices | 39 |
| Other (Please Specify) | 10 |
Q.3a-1 : -
3 - If 'Yes' to question 2, on what topics did you inquire (check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Disclosures 62 63.3% Off-balance sheet transactions, related party transactions, special purpose entities, or related partnership issues 64 65.3% Derivatives or other complex financial transactions 33 33.7% Risk management 40 40.8% Independence of the external auditor 57 58.2% Adequacy of external auditing 49 50.0% Adequacy of internal auditing 46 46.9% Ethics policies or practices 38 38.8% Other (Please Specify) 10 10.2%
• external auditor acting as consultant on projects
• Destruction of documents policy
• 401K & company stock
• implications re: company stock in employee 401(k)
• Company exposure - the company does business with Enron
• Compensation and Retention Plans, Pro Forma Accounting
• proforma earning process
• Surety Bond Risk
• Consulting relationships and dollar amounts
• All of the others covered on a regular basis
• Document retention policy - the shredding issue
Sample Answering: 12 responses
| Percent |
| Disclosures | 49 |
| Off-balance sheet transactions, relat... | 51 |
| Derivatives or other complex financia... | 22 |
| Risk management | 41 |
| Independence of the external auditor | 53 |
| Adequacy of external auditing | 48 |
| Adequacy of internal auditing | 42 |
| Ethics policies or practices | 36 |
| Not sure | 9 |
| Other (Please Specify) | 9 |
Q.4a-1 : -
4 - Which of the following issues related to Enron do you plan to put on the next audit committee agenda (check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Disclosures 84 49.4% Off-balance sheet transactions, related party transactions, special purpose entities, or related partnership issues 86 50.6% Derivatives or other complex financial transactions 38 22.4% Risk management 69 40.6% Independence of the external auditor 90 52.9% Adequacy of external auditing 82 48.2% Adequacy of internal auditing 71 41.8% Ethics policies or practices 61 35.9% Not sure 15 8.8% Other (Please Specify) 16 9.4%
• A reminder that the Board's primary job is the integrity of the co. and its documents , disclosures and public statements
• REAL responsibilities of a Board of Directors for a publicly held company
• Role of malfeasence of Enron CEO, CFO, etc.
• Have already discussed with Audit Committee and independent auditors
• My corporation is a domestic retailer with an unleveraged balance sheet, except for store leases, which are fully disclosed. Our audit committee regularly discusses the technical areas above that have relevance to our business.
• Making the assessment now.
• currently forming audit committee which will address most of above
• Implications re: 401(k) company stock investments
• don't have an aufit committee - board didn't want one
• Not on Audit Committee
• What's being concealed by materiality
• Not a member of audit committee
• We do not feel deficient . We will watch closely further developments.
• impact on the company because arthur andersen is the accountant
• Most of the above is covered currently
• just completed meeting, so issues listed in 3 are areas covered
• Surety Bond Risk
• Don't have an audit committee
• Optimum Capital Structure
• How appropriate reserves are determined
• We are also considering a discussion of these issues with the full board in the near future.
Sample Answering: 22 responses
| Percent |
| Changes to format or content of finan... | 6 |
| Revising and/or re-circulating your c... | 16 |
| Changes to other board or audit commi... | 20 |
| Change in external auditing firm | 6 |
| Change in provider of purchased (outs... | 6 |
| Change in provider of consulting serv... | 11 |
| Change in amount of non-audit service... | 16 |
| Planning is not yet complete - consid... | 76 |
5 - Which of the following actions have you taken or planned as a result of the Enron situation (check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Changes to format or content of financial disclosures 9 5.9% Revising and/or re-circulating your code of ethics 25 16.4% Changes to other board or audit committee policies or procedures 30 19.7% Change in external auditing firm 9 5.9% Change in provider of purchased (outsourced) internal audit services 9 5.9% Change in provider of consulting services or other non-audit services 17 11.2% Change in amount of non-audit services provided by external auditor 25 16.4% Planning is not yet complete - considering various alternatives 115 75.7%
| Percent |
| Review annual communication about ind... | 73 |
| Review amount/cost of non-audit servi... | 66 |
| Review types of non-audit services pr... | 63 |
| Prohibit obtaining non-audit services... | 9 |
| Conduct a periodic assessment of exte... | 43 |
| Establish policies on the selection a... | 40 |
| Establish policies on hiring employee... | 10 |
| Require periodic rotation of external... | 9 |
| Not sure | 10 |
| Other (Please specify) | 6 |
Q.6a-1 : -
6 - Which of the following steps does the board or audit committee take to monitor and assure the independence of the external auditors (Check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Review annual communication about independence from external auditors to audit committee 127 72.6% Review amount/cost of non-audit services provided by the external auditor 116 66.3% Review types of non-audit services provided by the external auditor 110 62.9% Prohibit obtaining non-audit services from the external auditor 16 9.1% Conduct a periodic assessment of external auditors' independence 76 43.4% Establish policies on the selection and/or retention of external auditors 70 40.0% Establish policies on hiring employees of the external auditing firm 18 10.3% Require periodic rotation of external auditors 15 8.6% Not sure 18 10.3% Other (Please specify) 11 6.3%
• Use separate external auditor for internal audit support
• We prohibit obtaining consulting services but not additional audit-related services such as forensics
• Audit committee interviews external auditors semiannually without any member of management present.
• currently setting up audit committee that will do most of the above
• Must get audit committee approval for non-audit services to be provided by external auditors
• limit the scope and amount of non-audit & non-tax services from
external audit firm
• none
• We are not required to have an external audit
• Make the selection of the outside auditor an audit committee responsibility.
• We have little if any non audit services, other than tax work done by our ourside ausitors. We are contemplating limited ourside help with our internal auditing. Probably not from our external auditor.
• no non audit services without audit comm approval.
• Discuss quarterly with external auditors in executive session
• Work for local government and they may make some changes but we don't have an audit committee
Sample Answering: 14 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 37 |
| 2. No | 45 |
| 3. Not sure | 19 |
7 - Does your organization have a formal Enterprise Risk Management process or other formal method of identifying risk? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 65 36.5% 2. No 80 44.9% 3. Not sure 33 18.5%
| Percent |
| 1. Generally high risk | 32 |
| 2. Generally medium risk | 21 |
| 3. Generally low risk | 22 |
| 4. Not included in risk management sy... | 4 |
| 5. Not sure | 21 |
8 - If 'Yes' to question 7, how are off-balance sheet transactions, related party transactions, special purpose entities, and related partnership issues viewed in terms of risk? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Generally high risk 26 32.1% 2. Generally medium risk 17 21.0% 3. Generally low risk 18 22.2% 4. Not included in risk management system 3 3.7% 5. Not sure 17 21.0%
| Percent |
| Annual reports on risk from management | 27 |
| Annual reports on risk from internal ... | 26 |
| Periodic reports on risk throughout t... | 73 |
| Periodic reports on risk throughout t... | 45 |
| Special reports on risks when signifi... | 62 |
| Review of all internal audit reports | 28 |
| Review of summary information from in... | 38 |
| None of the above | 5 |
| Other (please specify): | 3 |
Q.9a-1 : -
9 - How are you kept informed about significant risk issues at your organization (check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Annual reports on risk from management 47 26.7% Annual reports on risk from internal auditing or other review group 45 25.6% Periodic reports on risk throughout the year from management 128 72.7% Periodic reports on risk throughout the year from internal auditing or other review group 79 44.9% Special reports on risks when significant new risks come to the attention of management 109 61.9% Review of all internal audit reports 50 28.4% Review of summary information from internal audit reports 66 37.5% None of the above 9 5.1% Other (please specify): 5 2.8%
• Audit committee is active in asking about these issues
• As CEO, I see that we don't do things Enron did
• Ask questions
• External auditors are questioned at time of quarterly earnings releases, and semi-annually at meetings of audit committee without management present.
• reports on claims & litigation; insurance programme reports
• During Y2K which was significant risk to organization, we had a briefing at every board meeting - with report supplied beforehand and presentation during meeting.
• Operating review of revenue recognition
Sample Answering: 8 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 65 |
| 2. No | 11 |
| 3. Not sure | 24 |
10 - Does the board or audit committee charter give the board authority to engage independent counsel (other than the regular legal counsel for the organization)? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 116 65.2% 2. No 19 10.7% 3. Not sure 43 24.2%
| Percent |
| Corporate secretary | 40 |
| Other corporate legal | 44 |
| Other external legal (Please specify): | 30 |
Q.11a-1 : -
11 - Who provides legal counsel to the audit committee? Choice Count Percentage Answered Corporate secretary 65 39.6% Other corporate legal 72 43.9% Other external legal (Please specify): 49 29.9%
• outside counsel
• Same external counsel as company
• Independent Law Firm
• outside counsel representing both the company and the board
• retained law firm
• External Legal also serves as Corporate Legal
• External Counsel
• Our prime law firm, when needed
• The company's outside counsel
• oon occasion have hired counsel to Audit or other comittees in addition to using services of corp outside counsel
• Has not been an issue so far.
• outside counsel
• Outside Counsel
• External legal counsel
• outside specialist counsel on specific technical matters
• n/a
• Outside counsel at the board's request.
• Outside law firm
• Corporation's Outside Law Firm
• Outside company counsel
• independent law firm
• Outside Counsel to the company
• Corporate legal counsel
• Independent Law Firm
• Local attorney
• independant counsel
• Outside law firm
• Corporate attorney
• Counsel to the Board of Directors (not corporate counsel)
• Outside Counsel
• external corp counsel
• Determined by type of issue
• Independent Legal Firm
• Outside general counsel
Sample Answering: 36 responses
| Percent |
| Management | 69 |
| External auditors | 62 |
| Internal audit staff | 28 |
| Accounting staff | 19 |
| Legal counsel | 45 |
| Professional Association/Other (pleas... | 3 |
Q.12a-1 : -
12 - Have you asked any of the following groups for advice or information because of the Enron situation (check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Management 73 68.9% External auditors 66 62.3% Internal audit staff 30 28.3% Accounting staff 20 18.9% Legal counsel 48 45.3% Professional Association/Other (please specify): 3 2.8%
• none
• Not yet!
• investment bankers
• no
• no
Sample Answering: 6 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 56 |
| 2. No | 44 |
13 - Is your organization subject to SEC regulations? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 100 56.5% 2. No 77 43.5%
| Percent |
| 1. Review by both internal and extern... | 28 |
| 2. Review by external auditors only | 16 |
| 3. No related-party transactions | 33 |
| 4. Not sure | 23 |
14 - How does your organization audit related-party transactions? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Review by both internal and external auditors 49 28.3% 2. Review by external auditors only 28 16.2% 3. No related-party transactions 57 32.9% 4. Not sure 39 22.5%
| Percent |
| 1. Review by both internal and extern... | 25 |
| 2. Review by external auditors only | 12 |
| 3. No complex financial transactions | 52 |
| 4. Not sure | 12 |
15 - How does your organization audit derivatives and other complex financial transactions? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Review by both internal and external auditors 42 24.6% 2. Review by external auditors only 20 11.7% 3. No complex financial transactions 89 52.0% 4. Not sure 20 11.7%
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 20 |
| 2. No | 71 |
| 3. Not sure | 8 |
16 - The internal auditing function at Enron relied partly upon Enron staff and partly on co-sourcing with the external auditor. Do you presently purchase internal audit services from your external auditor? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 36 20.3% 2. No 126 71.2% 3. Not sure 15 8.5%
| Percent |
| 1. Less than 10% | 24 |
| 2. 10% - 25% | 20 |
| 3. 25% - 40% | 9 |
| 4. 40% - 75% | 9 |
| 5. 75% - 100% | 13 |
| 6. Not sure | 26 |
17 - If 'Yes' to question 16, what percentage of total internal audit services (based on hours worked) is purchased from your external auditor? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Less than 10% 11 23.9% 2. 10% - 25% 9 19.6% 3. 25% - 40% 4 8.7% 4. 40% - 75% 4 8.7% 5. 75% - 100% 6 13.0% 6. Not sure 12 26.1%
| Percent |
| 1. By a full-time, on-staff chief aud... | 69 |
| 2. By the outside organization provid... | 15 |
| 3. Other (please specify): | 15 |
Q.18a-1 : -
18 - If 'Yes' to question 16, how are those services managed and monitored? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. By a full-time, on-staff chief audit executive 27 69.2% 2. By the outside organization providing the internal auditing services 6 15.4% 3. Other (please specify): 6 15.4%
Sample Answering: 5 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Audit committee | 61 |
| 2. President or chief executive officer | 12 |
| 3. Chief financial officer | 19 |
| 4. Other (please specify): | 8 |
Q.19a-1 : -
19 - To whom does your chief audit executive deliver audit reports? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Audit committee 104 61.2% 2. President or chief executive officer 21 12.4% 3. Chief financial officer 32 18.8% 4. Other (please specify): 13 7.6%
• As well to the Audit Committee and President
• both of the top 2
• All of the above
• C FO, CEO and Chair of Audit Committee; summaries are distributed semi-annually to entire Board
• All of above
• CFO and CEO are informed of reports delivered to Audit Committee
• No chief audit exec
• Chairman
• no such position
• TO CEO,BUT HAS ACCESS TO AUDIT CMTE IF NEEDED
• He delivers reports to all of the above
• Oversight committee, CEO,CFO,Controller,General Counsel
• Jointly to audit committee and CFO
• All of the above
Sample Answering: 16 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Audit committee | 52 |
| 2. President or chief executive officer | 20 |
| 3. Chief financial officer | 18 |
| 4. Other (please specify): | 9 |
Q.20a-1 : -
20 - Who is responsible for evaluating the performance of your chief audit executive? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Audit committee 88 52.4% 2. President or chief executive officer 34 20.2% 3. Chief financial officer 31 18.5% 4. Other (please specify): 15 8.9%
• all above participate
• Again, you only allow one answer. Responsibility for evaluating performance of audit executive (1) Audit Committee AND (2) CEO
• As well as the Chief financial officer
• entire board
• All have some role
• CFO and audit committee
• He reports to the CEO but is accountable to the audit committee
• No chief audit exec
• n/a
• CEO+AUDIT COMMITTEE
• The VP and Controller who is his supervisor and the Audit Committee has direct line to the Chief Audit executive.
• Oversight Committee
• Joint responsibility of CFO and Audit Committee
• All of the above
• Board of Directors
• Board of Directors
Sample Answering: 17 responses
Q.21 What new
information or guidance from regulators or professional associations would be
helpful to you regarding issues related to Enron? • discussion on rotation of external auditors
• Structure of ENRON's board and committees and frequency of board/committtee
meetings. Also, did they have a governance (board matters) committee?
• Review of what Enron's Audit Committee was doing.
• Our company's practices are so far removed from those at Enron; we are so
conservatively financially managed (and audited); and given the size of the
company the board of directors are quite engaged and well-informed (and also ask
a lot of questions); that I'm not sure if we are likely to be impacted by
"issues related to Enron".
• Full disclosure of the chronoplogical events leading up to this debacle and
all the decisions make by all parties relative to the review , evaluation and
acceptance of the disclosures made.
• re definition of auditor's responsiblities
• 1. Treatment of off-balance sheet transactions. 2. Independence of auditing
from consulting services 3. Ethical principles for external auditors
• Any and all information. We are interested in all matters related to Enron.
• Formal rules governing the independence of external auditors or accounting
firms.
• The US needs to evaluate the responsibilities, authority, and EXPOSURE that
individual members of BODs have. To date they have been operating without
personal risk and liability (i.e., no personal responsibility for losses, etc).
The primary rationale for the BOD is to protect the interests of individual
stockholders. How are the Enron BOD members going to pay the individual legal
price for their individual and collective failures???
• Read the filings
• Information on specific topics and areas for Audit Committees to be
reviewing and guidance on allocation of Committee time for various topics.
• guidelines for the qualification and selection of audit committee members;
guidelines on functions of audit committee and "best pratice" suggestions
• What authority can directors gain in taking control of outside auditors and
information about outside auditors
• Due to the comparatively straight-forward nature of our business, which is
domestic retailing, I am not looking for any such guidance, other than a
reinforcement of the importance of directors' maintaining an independent posture
at the same time that they support management's efforts to achieve the company's
goals and business plans.
• Not clear. What I can determine, Enron seems to have deliberate fraud or
head in the sand attitude by lots of responsible parties.Kinds of issues in
Enron already part of my intense scrutiny as Chairman of Audit Committee.
• 1. Guidance relating to retention of audit records by outside auditors. 2.
Experience relating to rotation of outside auditors. 3. Information relating to
outside auditors income from clients for non-audit services. 4. Specific rules
relating to disclosure of self-dealing of executives with their employers.
• Policies related to off balance sheet transactions Guidelines for the
evaluation of the chief audit executive
• Guidelines of "best practices" regarding audit committees. Suggested system
of internal controls that provide checks and balances between the Board and
management.
• More pressure to make Auditors accountable only to the Board and Audit
Committee. The practice continues to be management relates to the Auditors and
the Audit Committee oversees the relationship. Too frequently there is a defacto
understanding between the Auditors and the Managers to not let issues get to the
Audit committee.
• 1 prohibition of internal audit by outside auditors 2.require plain english
disclosure of spec purpose entities, debt concealment, etc
• Use of external auditor for non-audit purposes Employment of ex-external
audit employees
• Accounting information on treatment of off balance sheet partnerships Board
policies on disclosure of off balance sheet debt. Policy on internet chatroom
discussion, internal or external, by corporate officers.
• a good summary of what happened at Enron.
• Assistance in keeping these matters in perspective. Very few entities have
similar exposures as Enron and we needed adapt to the weakest link.
• A summary of what they did improperly and how to avoid those same mistakes
• Don't do a bunch of stupid, grandstanding stuff as a result of the feeding
frenzy.
• none
• Clearer rules on auditor independence and on relaterd-party transactions.
• 1. In considering whether it makes sense to switch auditors (our
size/complexity indicates should use one of the "big 5") it would be desirable
to know: (A) Are there rising auditors that can provide the level of services as
the "big 5" and how does one find them? (B) How can auditors be evaluated for
reliability, how can they be compared, what is their history of performance
whether they are "big 5" or auditors that are rising to such level? (C) What
would be the process for changing auditors and what are the pitfalls to avoid?
2. Reportedly, two of the "big 5" did NOT lobby actively against Arthur Levit's
proposals; would be interesting to know who they were and why they did not lobby
against the proposals. 3. To reduce the reported conflict of interest between
audit and consulting services, is there an effective way for the auditor to be
organized so that such services are in separate divisions (with separated
personnel evaluation and promotion arrangements) and/or would having audit fees
coming from Board's budget help reduce the conflict of interest?
• Are there some simple guidelines to help Board members (who are not
accountants) be aware when financials are not revealing the true status of a
company?
• In my view, and almost completely ignored, a major part of the Enron
problem is the Financial Accounting Standards Board. This group has lost site of
reality and have been issuing accounting principles that cannot be interpreted
or applied consistently by companies (e.g. FASB 133 on derivatives). Enron had
smart people that interpreted these accounting principles to their own benefit,
however the FASB has to go back to basics with accounting guidance. As a CPA and
a current CFO I am highly critical of the FASB.
• REALISTIC GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES FROM FORTUNE 500
• What advice and suggested recommendations all public companies should take
to make sure there are no current issues and help prevent future issues from
arrising... based on the Enron case (should go beyond just derivatives to
include the fundamentals).
• How to prevent another "Enron"
• how much money is too much money to pay directors... what rules should
apply to sales of stock by directors...
• An explanation of the facts rather than media speculation.
• A detail of the procedures and processes that Enron used that were
inappropriate. • First would like to see measured response by regulators to Enron event and
not overreaction. The role of professional associations in this regard is to act
as a buffer against media hype and regulatory overreaction. Specific areas to
address: (1)Reasonable rules and limitations on use of employer stock,
especially ability to diversify. (2) Disclosure of related party transactions in
financial statements (3)revenue recognition on complicated financial
transactions, especially involving SPVs. (4) requiremetns/definitions of auditor
indpedence
• About 9 months before the Enron scandal broke, we began to develop a formal
risk management program. As Chair of our Audit Committee, I read whatever I
could find on the subject but clearly, there could be more written which would
be useful. While no one process will fit all companies, I am confident that
there are enough similarities to merit development of common guidelines.
• A clear list of items that outline what to expect from the accounting firm.
Historically, outside of the management letter, there is little feedback of a
substantive nature relative to how our company stacks up relative to like firms
in the risk assessment. There aught to be a value system to suggest on a
relative basis where our company ranks in each specific area with respect to
peer companies, e.g Rev recog., Business Risk assesment, Contract accounting,
forecastng processes, investments in product development. Rather there is a
uninformative discussion that relates to 'you're ok'.
• Identify potential conflict of interest situations involving external
auditors which might contribute to unusual flexibility in their allowing (or
condoning) certain marginal accounting practices. AA, for example, given the
amount of its annual fee, might have felt pressure in going against management's
wishes if that would mean the loss of Enron's business. Accordingly, then:
Should a large company have more than one auditor? Should the audit be done by a
committee of external auditors? What might be an appropriate set of safeguards
against an EnronII in my company.
• What would and what would not constitute non-audit services which would not
violate the independence issue.
• My concern is that future Government regulations will cause Corporations to
cease their match of employee 401K contributions due to the filing and reporting
requirements. This will hurt the non-highly compensated employees who need this
program to supliment their retirement.
• white papers on specific issues - how they can be identified and addressed
checklists seminars
• Conclusions from Congress
• ethics seems to be the basic issue for mgmt & external audit.
• The first and most glaring failure of the Audit Committee Management and
the Board of Enron was to waive the conflict of interest restriction that allow
the CFO to work both side of the fence. Secondly, the neglect of the Board the
review new partnership after the first template was approved. It is clear the
Board did not approve each and every subsequent partnership (numbering in the
hundreds or more) that the CFO devised. It would appear the Board either
directly or de facto allowed management to continue unimpeded after the first
partnership template was approved.
• What general questions should an audit committe ask and of whom to insure
they aren't missing something?
• NONE
• Information about the risks and how to manage them of having the external
auditor provide consulting services ot management
Sample Answering: 53 responses
• It may be possible
for legislators and regulators to respond to what happened at Enron, but it is
unlikely that they can constrain themselves and adopt regulations "just broad
enough to keep the horse in the barn." More than likely, the political charge of
this issue will result in regulations that are overly broad, implying that any
company, left to its own devices, would do what Enron did. Certainly, we have
all observed the power of group-think. It happens in all groups, large and
small, public and private. When individuals work closely with one another,
day-in and day-out, they develop an allegiance, to one another, and to the
issues that bind them. They lose objectivity. In a business setting, the
auditors are supposed to bring that element of objectivity. Enron clearly fell
prey to group-think. Unfortunately, their auditors were part of the group. At
its earliest stages, Enron's accounting methods were likely aggressive, but
reasonable and lawful. At that point, the Company was likely poulated by
well-intentioned managers whose activities were monitored by well-intentioned
independant auditors. The erosion most likely occurred gradually and subtly,
escaping notice. The magnitude of the transgressions grew like a cancer and
became so common as to seem perfectly normal to those who on the inside. The
impropriety could and would be obvious only to the independant outside observer.
So where were the Auditors? Where was the Board? The auditors should have blown
the whistle. They saw it, and they turned a blind eye because they, too, fell
prey to the forces of greed. The accounting profession has demonstrated beyond
all doubt that it cannot be left to regulate itself. New regulations should
focus on ensuring the independence and competence the auditors. If such
regualtions are adopted, there should be no need to impose yet more regulations
on business. If the auditors do their job, Enron doesn't happen.
• The most blatant concern was Enron's waiving of the
code of conduct. That needs to be automatically a note of materiality to the
SEC.
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 46 |
| 2. No | 30 |
| 3. Not sure | 24 |
22 - Do you believe that major changes are needed to U.S. accounting standards? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 82 46.3% 2. No 53 29.9% 3. Not sure 42 23.7%
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 37 |
| 2. No | 37 |
| 3. Not sure | 25 |
23 - The SEC has proposed a new public oversight group for external auditing, not affiliated with the AICPA. Do you believe that a new public oversight group should be created to monitor external auditing? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 66 37.3% 2. No 66 37.3% 3. Not sure 45 25.4%
| Percent |
| 1. Yes | 38 |
| 2. No | 33 |
| 3. Not sure | 29 |
24 - If 'Yes' to question 23, should the AICPA play a direct role in the oversight group? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes 32 37.6% 2. No 28 32.9% 3. Not sure 25 29.4%
| Percent |
| Board of directors | 87 |
| Chairman of the board | 16 |
| Member of audit committee | 46 |
| Chairman of the audit committee | 26 |
| Other board position (please specify): | 19 |
Q.25a-1 : -
25 - Which of the following positions do you hold (check all that apply)? Choice Count Percentage Answered Board of directors 152 86.9% Chairman of the board 28 16.0% Member of audit committee 80 45.7% Chairman of the audit committee 46 26.3% Other board position (please specify): 33 18.9%
Sample Answering: 35 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Agriculture, Mining or Construction | 3 |
| 2. Banking or Finance | 10 |
| 3. Chemical or Drug | 3 |
| 4. Communications | 6 |
| 5. Educational Institutions | 2 |
| 6. Government | 1 |
| 7. Healthcare | 8 |
| 8. Insurance | 5 |
| 9. Manufacturing | 31 |
| 10. Petroleum | 1 |
| 11. Wholesale or Retail | 6 |
| 12. Services | 17 |
| 13. Transportation | 3 |
| 14. Utilities | 4 |
Q.27-1 country - country
26 - What is your organization's primary industry (Choose the option that most closely describes your organization)? Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Agriculture, Mining or Construction 6 3.4% 2. Banking or Finance 17 9.7% 3. Chemical or Drug 5 2.9% 4. Communications 10 5.7% 5. Educational Institutions 3 1.7% 6. Government 2 1.1% 7. Healthcare 14 8.0% 8. Insurance 9 5.1% 9. Manufacturing 54 30.9% 10. Petroleum 2 1.1% 11. Wholesale or Retail 11 6.3% 12. Services 30 17.1% 13. Transportation 5 2.9% 14. Utilities 7 4.0%
| Item | Frequency | Percent |
| USA | 165 | 92.2% |
| UMI | 2 | 1.1% |
| (Not Answered) | 5 | 2.8% |
| (Unique responses) | 7 | 3.9% |
| (Total) | 179 | 100.0% |
Sample Answering: 174 responses
| Percent |
| 1. Yes, please contact me. I have kno... | 5 |
| 2. Yes, I am willing to discuss these... | 24 |
| 3. No | 71 |
Q.32 Additional comments on this topic or survey?
31 - Would you be willing to talk to an IIA editor about issues surrounding Enron or related situations (if yes, you must provide contact information in question 30)? Answer required to enable automatic response submission. Choice Count Percentage Answered 1. Yes, please contact me. I have knowledge or expertise that I would like to share 9 5.1% 2. Yes, I am willing to discuss these issues if contacted 42 23.6% 3. No 127 71.3%
• the external auditor should not provide other services to the organization. conflicts of interest need to be avoided.
• none
• Excellent initiative, look forward to the survey results.
• Enron's problems came excessive devotion to Wall Street, severely immoral behavior of execs; toleration/encouragement of self-dealing between co. and high execs;gamesmanship of accounting rules which distored overall financial reports; excessive risk-seeking culture. A. Anderson's problems were excessive rewards to profitable office and officers; failure to fulfill their moral and public responsibilities; beings bought off by exessive consulting fees; being involved in out-of-the-box risky activities in auditing where the requirement in in-the-box type of work; a total lack of risk management; direct unethical conduct
• Independent auditors should be prohibited from doing consulting. Related party transactions should be prohitited. They are at our company. Enron and Anderson Execs should go to jail. Anderson shouold be prohibited from practicing before the SEC.
• Andersen has been very ill-advised on appropriate and effective crisis mgmt.
• Well constructed survey.
• Changes have to be made. Enron is a sorry story for individuals who counted
on
this firm.
• The biggest obstacles to reliable financial reporting have been Congressional interference with FASB and Internal Revenue Code section 162(m), which has shifted so much of executive compensation to stock options and incentive plans. Dishonest management will always be able to outsmart honest auditors for a period of time, and section 162(m) increases the stakes for management to cheat. Also, we neeed to ensure that auditing firms properly staff and plan their audits and are paid adequately for audit work. Too many CPA firms have used audit proposals as "loss leaders" that enable them to sell expensive consulting engagements. The peer review process obviously has not worked; but it seems to not work in any profession. (How many lawyers or doctors lose their licenses?) Mandatory rotation of audit firms may be an idea whose time has come, but it will add considerably to the cost of audits.
• Enron in its essence is a corporate governance failure from what I can see.
• Good idea to solicit comments from active directors.
• My bottom line is that dishonest management will always beable to get around the rules and fool the auditors,regulators, directors and the public. The only real defense available to directors is their ability to identify honest managers. The whole acctg system is out of phase with reality. Periodic reporting is offered but the world needs real time information.
• Ball takes the high road and its accounting is very ethical, but I believe in many companies there is a tacit understanding between management and its external auditor that smoothing earnings or finding a few pennies to meet market expectations is an acceptable practice. One of the big five firms (not Ball's auditor) has argued to me that it is fairer--i.e. less misleading--to smooth earnings. This view is corrupting. Option grants should be an expense. Reporting would be improved and egregious granting practices might be reined in and management might therefore be less tempted to push to show short term results. SPVs are a good thing for isolating risks to facilitate financings. We need to rethink, however, the rules for allowing them to be off balance sheet.
• It appears to me, based on a couple of interviews that I have seen, that the AICPA has become more intent on making excuses for the accounting industry than admitting to mistakes in the Enron situation; therefore, it has demonstrated an unsuitability to serve as an effective self regulatory organization. I am concerned that the powers (regulators, Congress, etc) are inclined to place more pressure on the board and audit committees to monitor managment. I believe that such is not the most effective means of controlling management. Eventually, audit committees will become so inundated with oversight that the audit committee members will be required to devote full time to their growing duties. Will the audit committee become a part of management? Will the audit committee become a third arm of governance in addition to the board and management? Management must be held liable by the powers and pay with money and time for improper or illegal activities.
• Survey limited. Mostly applies to public and not private companies.
• Actually, most of our changes were BEFORE the Enron mess, in that our CEO apparently hid the level of the organization's distress from the Board. We have spent the last 16 months understanding the true financial situation and narrowly avoiding bankruptcy. In a perverse way, our board members are relieved that even the "big shot" directors can be caught flat footed - but, sadly, that still doesn't solve our problems of (1) reserves gone, (2) in debt, (3) economy down, and (4) still no new CEO...
• Integrity is critical in all aspects of business.You can not legislate it. Lawmakers hypocracy is sickening.
• I believe that fraud was committed by Enron. My organization was approached to do a great deal of business with Enron. Anecdotal reports are that the written offers never came back in the same form as the verbal offers that were made and agreed upon in principal. Enron basically never kept its word. There are deeper issues here to deal with than just accounting.
• Question #22 - "Materiality" must be abandoned and a new approach subsitituted for small unknowns or small irregularities or "materiality" must be revised/defined more carefully. If revised, it must include a way to deal with many non-material items that, when accumulated, really are material.
• No
• The most troubling aspect of both Enron management and their board was their reliance on legal advice as oversight to the satisfactory discharge of their responsibilities. It seems that the operative concern was "Are my skirts clean?", not, "Am I adequately representing the shareholder?"
• GOOD JOB;VERY TIMELY
• It is about time the independence of external auditors was mandated. Financial disclosure rules are inadequate for investors. In too many cases only insiders understand the financial risks of companies.
• I hope the government and the public finds out if wrong was done and if so deals appropriately with the wrong doers, but I also hope these same people look rationally at the vast majority of corporate America who follow the rules and display sound ethical behavior, and do not add needless and punitive regulation etc.
• I have only been on the audit committee for a year. Many of the questions raised by this survey were addressed at our last meeting. This survey has raised additional questions that as a director, I will be persuing.
• too much is being made upon this event... les there is lesss here than meets the eye...
• I feel the survey is very appropriate and would like to learn of the results.
• Thank you
• The Enron issue relates to breaches of ethical conduct on the part of management and the board of directors. I also believe that when the Chairman of the Board and the CEO are one in the same, the principle of control is practically eliminated. Accounting only reflects what management does. However, the rules should be tighten to avoid "pro forma" reporting and other accounting shenanigans.
• None
• Thank you for doing this. My organization's Board is very nervous about the fallout from Enron given a recent financial problem within our company. We are planning to review Board Governance issues at our upcoming retreat and will want to have the results of this survey as background. Again, thank you.
• If possible I would like to receive the survey results by email. CopilotA@aol.com
• Please, do whatever you can to discourage our Government from passing additional regulations that will further punish those many, many Corporations who, unlike Enron's Senior Management and perhaps, their outside Auditor, do behave in a very responsible manner.
• glad you are following interest/concern responsively
• Survey is too narrow. The oversight of the supervision dept. of the SEC, far too complicated FASB's, Board governance and the "old boy network", Board independence, the failure of public accounting firms to work as independent agents, and the lack of basic ethics are a real threat to "free markets and capitalism". If the investing public can not restore the faith in the system, then our financial world will change materially.
Sample Answering: 37 responses